a recently tested data protocol in Canada, implements spatial analyses such as spatial cluster analysis on data from 3,000 practices. 8 In the United Kingdom, with its near universal registration and extensive advanced computerisation of practices, data from GP practices have been used to map chronic obstructive pulmonary disease at the national scale 9 and type-2 diabetes at a local scale.
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Geographic GP practice data: the problem
In Australia, data extracted from GP data collections for research and analysis purposes rarely incorporate spatial information, with the exception of postcodes. The main reason for this is to ensure patient privacy by providing information in such a way that the information is not identifiable. Identifiable information should not be made available to researchers without explicit patient consent and, in general, obtaining consent of all patients in a practice is not practical, although in most cases opportunities are provided for patients to opt out of such data extractions. Since addresses can individually identify patients, they must be removed or otherwise obscured (as must other identifiers) from any data where each record represents a patient or a patient encounter if they are to where an individual's record can be 'confused' with at least k other records.
While 'on-the-fly' aggregation of clinical data and patient addresses to small geographies may achieve the optimal solution of providing data privacy while allowing meaningful analyses, such solutions are difficult to implement and not usually available. One solution is to extract patient postcodes from GP data collections, which effectively provides privacy protection through de facto aggregation, since postcodes in urban Australia have a more than enough people (median census population in postcodes is 3,500), contingent on the number of attributes associated with each person.
In Australia, several utilities exist that can extract clinical data from practice management databases but most do not extract geography, and those that do usually extract postcodes. 1 These tools include GRHANITE (GeneRic HeAlth Network Information Technology for the Enterprise), 14 Canning Division Tool and Pen CAT. 15 The lack of geography in data extracted from GP practices may in part be because the clinicians, researchers or decision-makers using GP practice data have not needed the spatial dimension of the patient data. Data custodians may consider requests from researchers for spatial health data at a finer precision than postcodes, since such parties may be considered as 'trusted' or 'semi-trusted' as opposed to release of data to the general public. 8, 18 Indeed, there exists a privacy-access continuum with individually identifiable restricted data at one end and aggregated publicly accessible data at another. Researchers may need individuallevel data but, unlike GPs, may not require identifiable individual data. Many geospatial research problems can be successfully addressed with data at a reasonable degree of aggregation. 19 However, currently in the Australian GP practice data context, there is no opportunity to release data at a geographic precision between patient address and postcode. That is to say that it is an all-or-nothing approach -release data (albeit to trusted users) that includes individually identifiable addresses, or limit the location accuracy to postcode. Having the flexibility to choose a geography that is appropriate for a given project is important. An appropriate level often lies between address and postcode, since this can both refine the analyses and retain confidentiality.
Geographic GP data: a possible solution
One compromise approach requires that either the researcher or a computer program have access to the address data and the clinical data, but not both at the same time. Therein lies the solution. In fact, for some time researchers have realised that the key to de-identifying individual level or "unit record" data is the separation of identifying information such as names and birthdays from other clinical and demographic information. 5, 20 In the Australian context, there is a large body of literature on the process of de-identification and linkage of administrative data. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] In addition to separating the identifying information from the clinical data, these processes seek to link various datasets together while separating the linkage process from the datasets. The identifying information are removed, linked and encrypted. Unit records in the datasets are then assigned the encrypted keys that can be used to link them together on the fly, or they can be analysed independently if so desired without any breach of confidentiality. In addition to identifiable information being separated from clinical data, there is role separation between individuals who work with the clinical data and those who work with the identifiable information such as addresses. Such protocols have been used for some large surveys. 23 Of the various administrative data linkage units in Australia, such as Data Linkage Western Australia, few incorporate geography beyond postcodes 24 and these usually do not link to GP practice data (other than through ad hoc requests for linkage), although given the richness of such datasets their inclusion could greatly enhance the research potential of the data.
A similar approach has also been adopted in the GP practice spatial-data domain in a spatial analysis project in Tower Hamlets, London. In this project a pseudonymised identifier was created for each record in the databases 5 of participating GP practices. The clinical data attached to the identifier and the postcodes attached to the identifier were extracted separately and reattached later for analysis. Note that six-digit postcodes in the UK are only slightly larger than ASGS Mesh Blocks. A similar exercise in Australia would have to be done at a geography with fine enough a resolution to achieve the required precision of analysis -a criteria that, as discussed above, Australian postcodes will often not satisfy.
Since the location information is to be separated from the clinical information and assigned unidentifiable keys, finer precision location information held separately from the clinical data does not additionally compromise the data over coarser precision data, as long as the geography is suitably coarse when reintegrated with the clinical data. For example, the use of addresses over postcodes does not in any way additionally compromise the data, as long as it is kept separately. In the section that follows, we describe a methodology we have developed and implemented that relies on the principle of separation and de-identification described above to analyse GP practice geospatial data in Australia and that allows external researchers to implement spatial analyses.
Method
The methods described here are those implemented by a team at the National Centre for Geographic and Resource Analysis in Primary Health Care (GRAPHC) in the Australian Primary Health Care Research Institute at the Australian National University. They are mostly described in a generalised form as the methods can be implemented in many ways but, where necessary, the terminology of the GRAPHC implementation is used for convenience.
In a typical scenario, a researcher wishes to analyse practice data from one or more general practices. The researcher registers with a secure dedicated server maintained by the GRAPHC team, after obtaining appropriate ethics clearances. The general practice data extraction process typically results in two datasets: de-identified clinical data; and the patient-identifying data that includes an address. Addresses from the patient data file are submitted to the secure dedicated server that returns a unique identifier for each address -GRAPHC uses a Globally Unique Identifier 28 (GUID), which has a very low likelihood of non-uniqueness. The identifier has no qualities that can be used to determine or derive an address. The new identifiers are known as GTAGs and, for convenience, we refer to them in this way throughout this discussion. As each identifier is returned, it is assigned to the appropriate de-identified clinical data record. In this way, the de-identified data can be handed to researchers and analysts without any directly embedded location data, but with a link that permits spatial referencing or spatial analysis at a later time.
Researchers can request particular spatial attributes or linked data for each relevant GTAG, or spatial analyses for batches of GTAGs. Addresses need to be geocoded to latitude and longitude within the secure server to permit the necessary analyses. Addresses and co-ordinates are never made available to external users, as this would breach privacy. The linked information requested could be:
• the region in which the address is located, generally in our context the ABS geographies such as the ASGS Statistical Area-1 (SA1) or the larger SA-2s or SA-3s;
• analyses such as the distances of a batch of GTAGs from a specific location such as a hospital;
• demographic, socioeconomic or other area-based population indicators available from GRAPHC (e.g. the GP-to-populationratio in an area).
Results are sent back to the researcher, either attached to GTAGs so they can be linked directly to the clinical records or as a report (such as maps and graphs), or both. This method allows the researcher to implement analyses at a meaningful and relevant spatial precision without compromising the researchers' ethical clearances or patient confidentiality. Figure 1 summarises the workflow described above.
In most situations, the researcher operates independently of the GRAPHC team, and thus does not have access to the clinical data and individual address information at one time.
In rare circumstances, when the researcher is based within the GRAPHC team (as in the example described below), the researcher is not permitted to access the GRAPHC server that implements the above protocol.
Results
The method described above has been implemented in the context of one GP practice in Adelaide. 29 The 3. Server Assigns unique GTAG to each address request.
1.
A clinical audit tool extracts records from a General racce evel aent dataase.
De-dened aent edical records.
Server returns a unique GTAG for each record.
 -Dt ustodi
Hth Rsh-Dt us Su Sv 5. Health researcher sumits atches of GTAGs requesng -area idener for aroved geograhic level -data from the server related to that geograhy -rescried saal analysis 2. Service Request to secure server . Sumits ONE address (nothing else so there is no context)
6. Server uses co-ordinates linked demograhic ariutes roung data etc. to rovide the area idener and undertake saal analyses etc.
Server tests if research request conforms to inially agreed uon thresholds of analyses.
4.
De-idened aent medical records with assigned GTAGs ready for use y health researcher.
Health researcher is returned a roduct such as an area idener aached to each GTAG or a requested analysis
The ariutes aached to the health records can e used y the health researcher directly for stascal analyses or aggregated results can e visualised as a Choroleth ma etc. 
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areas with this data. 29 A sample map from this research is displayed in Figure 2 . It shows a smoothed map of diagnosed diabetes rates per 1,000 people within the clinical data set.
Discussion
The problems faced by researchers wishing to apply spatial analyses to data collected from GP practices while maintaining patient privacy are significant. The approach outlined in this paper provides a means of allowing researchers to attach a spatial marker (like SA1 or SA2 identifiers), or implement additional analyses to the clinical demographic data extracted from a practice database, without the need to access any personal identifying information. The methodology allows additional analyses with finer levels of spatial data such as travel distances than could be implemented by researchers having access to only the areal spatial identifiers. To our knowledge, this is the first time in Australia that GP practice data has been used for geospatial analysis at a fine resolution in a privacy-protected manner using remote servers. Beyond this pilot project, the system and paradigm described here is being tested on a number of additional projects.
As with any system that manages sensitive information, it is important to assess possible scenarios through which data re-identification may be possible. 8 Two such scenarios are relevant to this system:
Re-identification through researcher
This paradigm ensures that the address and the patient data never come together. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the system cannot provide protection beyond what the researcher requests. It will, however, protect the researcher from inadvertent re-identification to a significant extent. If, for example, the researcher is permitted by the ethics committee to code addresses at the SA3 level (which are ASGS geographies with 30,000 to 130,000 people) and the researcher has registered this with the server administrators, then GRAPHC's GTAG System ensures that attempts to geoattribute to smaller geographies will not be successful.
The system cannot protect from reidentification through the introduction of secondary data. 13 It is possible that the use of small areas could introduce potential opportunities for re-identification of a person with otherwise unusual attributes (such as age, country of origin, unusual health conditions or more likely a combination of these). In these cases, the ethics approval could specify that the de-identified clinical data be stripped of such secondary indicators.
Alternatively, they could be aggregated (for example, to broader age groups) before geographic identifiers are added to comply with reasonable expectations of small area sample anonymity.
It is important to underscore the role of the researcher in protecting the privacy of health data. The onus is on the researcher to ensure the data are appropriately privacy protected at all stages. For example, the map in Figure  2 illustrates how a researcher may protect the privacy of data when publishing at small geographies. A choropleth map of diagnosed diabetes rates at SA1s may not necessarily be privacy protected. Since SA1s are small geographies, it may be possible to derive the number of cases in a geography from a map of rates and if, for example, only one case is found, to identify the person with additional information on the person/locality (in the case of this map, of course, no SA1 has less than 5 cases). However, if a map is 'smoothed' as in Figure 2 , in addition to the displayed rates being statistically more stable than if the rates were displayed at small geographies, 31 identification of individuals is impossible.
Re-identification through unauthorised access
The separation of patient addresses from their context data is the key to the power of this paradigm. A data hack 32 would have to access the secure server and also obtain clinical information from the practice or the researcher to be able to breach the privacy of the data. This scenario is extremely unlikely, given that researcher computers are separate from the secure server. It would be much easier to hack the practice database with patient clinical/address information. 19 Thus, this paradigm offers the research community the ability to analyse GP practice or other confidential data in a spatially explicit manner, without undue challenges to privacy.
Conclusions
The separation of identifiable and nonidentifiable clinical information, the use of a secure system to provide geographic information and the ability to link geography back to the confidential data provides an efficient and secure means of enabling spatial analysis of clinical data. While researchers and ethics committees must always apply care to setting the limits of such analyses to protect privacy, this system opens a door to a range of research that was otherwise not possible. The methods applied here can equally be 
